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The Quest of the Volk(swagen):
The Bricklin Car, Industrial Modernity,
and New Brunswick
DIMITRY ANASTAKIS
Entre 1974 et 1976, 3  000 automobiles Bricklin ont été fabriquées au Nouveau-
Brunswick avec l’aide du gouvernement, avant que l’entreprise ne fasse faillite. Cet
article s’intéresse à la Bricklin en tant que conception de la modernité industrielle,
qui reflète une constante de longue date parmi les politiques nationales partout dans
le monde, soit le lien qu’elles établissent entre l’émergence d’un secteur automobile
prospère et la maturité économique et politique. Il montre comment les politiciens,
les décideurs et les médias ont tenté, par l’entremise de la Bricklin, de façonner
l’identité collective et régionale en vue d’atteindre une modernité industrielle qui
était associée à la fabrication d’automobiles. La Bricklin était beaucoup plus
qu’une entreprise de fabrication d’automobiles; c’était une tentative pour
refaçonner l’idée même de province.
Three thousand Bricklin cars were built in New Brunswick between 1974 and 1976
with government support before the company went bankrupt.  This article examines
the Bricklin as an idea of industrial modernity, reflecting a long-standing thread
within national policies around the world linking the emergence of a successful
automotive sector to economic and political maturity.   It shows how politicians,
policymakers, and the media attempted, through Bricklin, to shape collective and
regional identity in order to achieve an industrial modernity that was associated
with car manufacture.  Bricklin was far more than a simple car company – it was an
attempt to reshape the very idea of a province.
MALCOLM BRICKLIN, A YOUNG, CHARISMATIC, SELF-PROMOTING
American automotive entrepreneur who was best known for bringing Subaru cars to
the United States, announced to great acclaim in 1973 that he was going to build a
dazzling new vehicle, the Bricklin SV1 (SV standing for Safety Vehicle). The
“Bricklin,” as it was to be known, was going to be the latest, greatest sports car.
Promoted as a technological and engineering marvel, the car would have “gull
wing” doors, acrylic body panels, and the most innovative safety features (including
a “safety frame,” roll cage, and above-average bumpers). Bricklin, a consummate
showman, immediately launched a massive public relations and advertising
campaign, appearing on numerous American television shows, in magazines, and
the trade press. The response was enthusiastic, and Bricklin was heralded as a
throwback to a bygone era: the last great automotive entrepreneur and a rags-to-
riches story of American know-how and individualism, akin to a Henry Ford or
Walter Chrysler. By 1974, the car’s distinctive image was entrenched in the North
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American collective consciousness. Bricklin and his cars appeared on the Today
Show, in an episode of the hit American television comedy Chico and the Man, in
Playboy and People magazines, and were featured prizes on popular television game
shows such as The Price is Right and Let’s Make a Deal.1
To the surprise of many Canadians, Bricklin announced that the vehicle would be
built in, of all places, New Brunswick. He had decided upon the province for the site
of his new auto-building venture after striking an agreement with the Progressive
Conservative government of Premier Richard Hatfield. Hatfield, recently elected,
saw in the Bricklin project a means of vaulting his province, which some saw as an
industrial backwater, into the first rank of car-producing regions. Enraptured by the
idea of building a sexy sports car in New Brunswick, the Hatfield government
granted Bricklin millions in loans and facilities, and eventually took a majority
ownership stake in the company. Bricklin, like a number of other projects in the
region during this period, represented a yearning for an industrially modern
economy in the Maritimes. This was an impulse as powerful – if not more so – as
any desire for a tourist economy based on tradition or nostalgia. Bricklin would
mean jobs for New Brunswickers, an influx of investment, industrial and economic
development, and, perhaps just as importantly for Hatfield, a new respect for his
province. With Bricklin, New Brunswick could transform itself into a new Detroit
or, at the very least, a Windsor or Oshawa in Ontario.2
Instead, Bricklin and Hatfield’s dreams quickly turned into a nightmare. The
firm’s shortcomings – poorly engineered cars, lack of experience, and corporate
disorganization – crippled the company. Bricklin had also greatly underestimated
the cost of launching a new vehicle. Nor did it help that the tumultuous 1970s auto
market lurched from one regulatory or gas-price crisis to the next – a difficult
situation for any carmaker, let alone a new entry into a highly competitive
marketplace.3 In the fall of 1975, after building nearly 3,000 cars, Bricklin was
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1 Some other examples of the news and auto media coverage of Bricklin include the following:
Bruce Little, “The Bricklin . . . bucking the odds,” Windsor Star, 17 August 1974; “3 years
planning, $20 million to make, and now . . . ,” Chicago Tribune, 30 June 1974; Ernest
Holsendolph, “Bricklin, U.S. ‘Safety Car’ in Debut; VW Beetle Begins Final Bows,” New York
Times, 26 June 1974; John Lamm, “America’s Newest Safety Vehicle: The Bricklin SV1 Sports
Car,” Motor Trend, July 1975, 89-90; and Brock Yates, “America’s Other Sports Car,” Car &
Driver, July 1974, 31-3. The author would like to thank the anonymous reviewers and the editors
for their helpful suggestions. Support for this article was provided by a Social Sciences and
Humanities Research Council grant.
2 Regional development in Atlantic Canada, and particularly industrialization/deindustrialization, is
a longstanding issue in Canadian political economy. See, for example, Masudul Alam Choudhury,
ed., The Political Economy of Development in Atlantic Canada (Sydney, NS: University College
of Cape Breton Press 1988); James Bickerton, Nova Scotia, Ottawa and the Politics of Regional
Development (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); and K.J. Rea and Nelson Wiseman,
eds., Government and Enterprise in Canada (Toronto: Methuen, 1985). Two specific case studies
of industrial development in Atlantic Canada are Meaghan Beaton and Del Muise, “The Road to
the Isle: The Canso Causeway, Tartan Tourism, Industrial Development and the Promise of
Progress/Modernization in Cape Breton,” Acadiensis XXXVII, no. 2 (Summer/Autumn, 2008):
39-69, and Dimitry Anastakis, “Building a ‘New Nova Scotia’: State Intervention, the Auto
Industry, and the Case of Volvo in Halifax, 1963-1996,” Acadiensis XXXIV, no. 1 (Autumn
2004): 3-30.
3 The regulatory crises involved safety, fuel economy, or emissions regulations.
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unceremoniously put into receivership when the New Brunswick government,
which by then owned 67 per cent of the company, pulled the plug. The province had
poured nearly $20 million dollars into the project. Hundreds of workers were left
unemployed, and Hatfield would spend years attempting to escape the political taint
of the Bricklin debacle. For his part, Malcolm Bricklin endured ignominious
bankruptcy court proceedings in his home state of Arizona. Instead of transforming
New Brunswick into a new Detroit, Bricklin became famous as a cautionary tale of
entrepreneurial hubris, state intervention in the economy, and the difficult realities
of carmaking in the era.4
Why did Hatfield and New Brunswick take the chance on what seems, in retrospect,
such a risky venture? The auto industry was (and remains) the highest-profile, most-
demanding, and most-competitive and technologically advanced industrial sector on
the planet. What made Hatfield think that starting an auto industry in New Brunswick
was a reasonable possibility? Certainly, jobs, investment, and development drew him to
the project. But the answer also lies, in part, in the allure of the auto sector as the
pinnacle of what can be referred to as “industrial modernity”; having a car industry was
seen, especially in the post-1945 period, as the essence of industrial maturity,
technological ability, and international economic status.5 Hatfield was willing to take
the chance because in Bricklin he saw an opportunity to recast New Brunswick’s image
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4 The only full-scale treatment of the Bricklin saga is a contemporary journalistic account by H.A.
Fredericks and A. Chambers that depended heavily upon interviews and newspaper reports: Bricklin
(Fredericton: Brunswick Press 1977). Others have also examined the case, including Sanford F.
Borins with Lee Brown, Investments in Failure: Five Government Corporations that Cost the
Canadian Taxpayer Billions (Toronto: Methuen, 1986). For a view of Hatfield’s role, see Richard
Starr, Richard Hatfield: The Seventeen Year Saga (Toronto: Formac Publishing Company, 1987),
especially chap. 6. Another, brief assessment is contained in Michel Cormier and Achille Michaud,
Richard Hatfield: Power and Disobedience (Fredericton: Goose Lane Publications, 1992).
5 See below for my explanation of “industrial modernity” in the context of the automobile. One
definition of “industrial modernity” is Peter J. Taylor’s, who describes industrial modernity as the
Figure 1: A Bricklin promotional image, 1973.
Source: RS417-76-12-a, Provincial Archives of New
Brunswick (PANB).
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and economy – a chance to capture some of the glory represented by the modern
automobile and its industry.
Building Bricklins in New Brunswick was about more than just jobs or
investment. It would allow the province to cloak itself in the modernity, newness,
and technology represented by the automobile. Doing so would break off the
shackles of what was seen as an industrial backwardness and second-class status
within Canada. This was particularly true in terms of New Brunswick’s relations
with Ottawa, central Canada, and what Hatfield perceived to be central Canada’s
prejudicial capitalist class – one that looked down upon the Atlantic Provinces. More
than just another economic development venture, Bricklin represented a new
beginning for New Brunswick – one embraced by so many nations and regions in
the post-war period as they sought to achieve industrial modernity.
In interpreting the Bricklin episode, this article has three interconnected aims. First,
it provides a brief contextual background and the argument that the Bricklin – despite
its later status as a cultural touchstone for failure – could reasonably have been
regarded initially as a realistic venture. Second, the article explores the notion of the
automobile as an idea of industrial modernity. It examines how New Brunswickers
imagined the Bricklin and its impact upon their province, and especially the views of
Premier Hatfield and his government – highlighted by the so-called “Bricklin election”
in 1974. Finally, an effort is made to draw broader meanings out of what the Bricklin
episode can reveal about New Brunswick, modernity, and the automobile. The aim
here is not to outline the entire story of Bricklin in New Brunswick or the reasons for
its eventual failure, but to explore some of the ideas and currents that underlay and
help to explain why Hatfield and his province were willing to take such a chance on
what, in hindsight, seems to have been such a dicey proposition.6
The Bricklin story
Looking back it is easy to scoff at the notion of the potential success of Bricklin, or
that the idea of a car company in New Brunswick was even remotely realistic. Given
what we know now, Bricklin seems absurd – a dream destined for inevitable failure.
And time has not been kind to the Bricklin. If it is remembered at all in the cultural
consciousness, it is as a shorthand for 1970s excesses – a type of post-modern, post-
embargo Edsel.7 Books such as How to Brickle (1977) made a mockery of the car
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second of three phases of modernity, starting with mercantile modernity instigated by the Dutch
duringin the 17th century, followed by British-sparked industrial modernity duringin the 18th and
19th centuries, and the current American-led consumer modernity. Other definitions of modernity
linked to industrial development include one by James Scott, who posits “high modernity” as the
construction of massive government-built public infrastructure projects. See Taylor, Modernities:
A Geohistorical Interpretation (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), and James
Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999).
6 This article constitutes a slice of a broader, forthcoming monograph – “Bricklin Dreams: The
Premier, the Promoter, the Province, and the Spectacular Failure of an Unlikely Car Company.”
As such, this article focuses on only some aspects of the Bricklin story.
7 On the Edsel and its place in consumer consciousness, see Thomas Dicke’s unpublished paper,
“The Edsel: Forty Years as a Symbol of Failure” (presented at the 2005 “Car in History
Conference,” University of Toronto).
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and the whole episode, as did songs such as Charlie Russell’s “The Bricklin” (1975),
whose chorus went:
O’ the Bricklin . . . O’ the Bricklin . . .
Is it just another, wait an’ see
We’ll let the Yankees try it
An’ hope to God they’ll buy it
Let it be dear Lord let it be.8
For automotive aficionados, the Bricklin regularly appears on lists of the worst cars
of all time, and the commentary attached to the vehicle is usually brutal in its
assessment.9 So unserious is the notion of the Bricklin that a musical comedy
recently premiered in New Brunswick to rave reviews: The Bricklin: An Automotive
Fantasy portrays Bricklin as a suave and swashbuckling American, with Hatfield in
the role of the earnest yet ambitious provincial who sings songs such as “High Risk
Venture” and “Keep it Under Your Hat” (the riskiness of the venture, that is).10 The
car has become, like its far-more-famous gull-winged doppelganger, the DeLorean,
something of a joke and a cultural punch line for failure.
But this was not the case, at least initially. The idea of a sexy new sports car –
and especially the car itself – were not considered a joke when Bricklin held a glitzy
1974 launch of the vehicle in New York City’s Four Seasons ballroom. With
Broadway crooner Sammy Kahn singing “The Most Beautiful Car in the World,”
(instead of “girl”) as an added touch of publicity, the car received largely favourable
reviews. The Bricklin’s rakish appearance, and the promise of making a virtue out
of “safety” – an issue increasingly on the minds of American consumers in the early
1970s – generated genuine optimism about its potential and a remarkable amount of
media attention. Many observers heralded the car as a breath of fresh air in an
automotive world bedeviled by regulations, gas shortages, and bland styling.11
Moreover, the potential sales of such a car were considerable. When Bricklin had
first announced the idea of a new high performance vehicle two years earlier, the
size of the sports car market in America was massive and growing; Bricklin set his
sights solely on the American car market; sales in Canada were an afterthought. By
the mid-1970s the Mustang and Camaro “pony cars,” which had so enticed the first
wave of baby boomers in the 1960s, were still selling hundreds of thousands of
vehicles each year. Bricklin’s aim to slice off a fraction of that market was not at all
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8 H.A. Fredericks, How to Brickle: The New Brunswick Funny Book (Saint John, NB: Omega
Publications, 1977); Charlie Russell, “The Bricklin” as quoted in How to Brickle, n.p.
9 An article in the Toronto Globe and Mail, “The 12 Worst Cars of All Time,” stated “The SV1
looked like an adolescent auto fantasy, but suffered from crippling design flaws and construction
quality that conjured up a Soviet-era Lada.” See Peter Cheney, 12 January 2010,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-drive/the-12-worst-cars-ever-built/article1443510.
10 The Bricklin: An Automotive Fantasy, a musical by Allen Cole and Paul Ledoux, premiered in
July of 2010 at the Fredericton Playhouse. Malcolm Bricklin himself made an appearance during
the premiere.
11 The launch had coverage in many newspapers in the US and Canada. One example is Jon Everett,
“Wraps Come Off N.B.’s Bricklin – New York Viewers Appear Impressed,” Telegraph-Journal
(Saint John), 26 June 1974.
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unreasonable at the time, and many auto observers welcomed the competition that
the car represented.12 After all, others had already recognized the potential for sports
car sales in America. Japanese manufacturers had successfully entered the market
with cars such as the Nissan/Datsun 240Z (introduced in 1970), followed by the RX-
7 at the end of the decade. Both vehicles had done very well, and reflected yet
another example of the audacity of the “Japanese invasion” of the US auto market.
For many American car-enthusiasts, the Bricklin represented a classic American
response to the challenges posed by the Japanese – an individual tale of innovation
and ingenuity that could reclaim America’s sports car crown.
Designed by well-known auto stylist Herb Grasse, who had worked at Ford and
Chrysler before being hired by Bricklin to visualize his new “safety vehicle,” the car
was sleek and attractive. Most notable were the gull-wing doors, which provided an
element of innovation and unorthodoxy for a mass-produced vehicle (only a
tremendously expensive 1954-57 Mercedes-Benz had such doors). Powered by
hydraulics, the doors kept the car low to the ground, and helped to create a futuristic
image of speed. Playboy magazine gushed that the Bricklin had a “gutsy, don’t-
tread-on-me look about it, somewhere between a Datsun 240Z and a Maserati
Ghibli, with Mercedes 300SL-like wings thrown in for good measure.”13 The
Bricklin promised to be a technological and stylistic marvel.
Captured by its appearance, and its safety and performance potential,
contemporary observers in the auto industry were indeed enthusiastic about the
Bricklin. Car & Driver’s September 1973 cover story trumpeted “The Best
American Sportscar: Bricklin or Corvette? (The Answer May Surprise You).” Road
& Track declared: “From what we have seen of the car so far we have to think that
the future of the Bricklin is a bright one, but only time and sales will tell.”14 This
enthusiasm spilled over to the members of the car-buying public, whom also seemed
keen on the Bricklin. As late as September of 1975, Mechanix Illustrated published
an article entitled “We Test the Amazing Bricklin” that overlooked the car’s
persistent quality problems and enthused that “we look for the ’76 and ’77 models
to show even better craftsmanship and design development.”15 Even as the company
went under in the fall of 1975, whatever Bricklins were coming off of the production
line in New Brunswick were being sold as soon as they shipped. In fact, every single
Bricklin produced had a buyer, and even in receivership the company had a backlog
of orders for the car. The Bricklin was, initially, a success at least from a sales and
marketing perspective.
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12 Bricklin foresaw a total market potential of nearly 600,000 vehicles in the sport and “safety”
categories, of which it aimed to have 30,000 in sales by its third year. See “Bricklin Vehicle
Corporation, and General Vehicle Inc.,” Prospectus, n.d., Bricklin Papers, National Automotive
History Collection (NAHC), ser. I, box 1, file 1, Exhibit B, Detroit Public Library (DPL).
13 Grasse had also gained fame as the designer of the “Batmobile” for the 1960s television show. To
view some of Grasse’s initial designs for the Bricklin, see the website at
http://www.herbgrassedesign.com/bricklin.htm. The Playboy quotation comes from Starr,
Richard Hatfield, 85.
14 John Dinkel, “America’s New Sports Car: The Bricklin,” Road & Track (September 1973): 98;
“Best American Sportscar,” Car & Driver (September 1973): 4-6. See also Tom Benjamin,
“Bricklin Gets Largely Favorable Reviews,” Telegraph-Journal, 9 May 1975.
15 Bob Tripolsky, “We Test the Amazing Bricklin,” Mechanix Illustrated (September 1975): 36-7.
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Figure 2: Malcolm Bricklin: the man
behind the dream.
Source: RS417-76-12-i, PANB.
Behind it all was the man himself, Malcolm Bricklin. Bricklin was the classic
American success story. He had first found fortune in the hardware store business,
becoming a millionaire by his mid-twenties. In the late 1960s, Bricklin got involved
in the motor-scooter business, and then moved onto the auto industry. This pursuit
reflected his brash personality. In January of 1975 the Saint John Telegraph Journal,
a paper that had intimately followed the Bricklin story, pegged him perfectly:
Bricklin was “a dreamer, a promoter and an entrepreneur. He is imaginative,
confident, cocky, and he just plunge[s] ahead. He doesn’t believe in looking back.”16
Bricklin had envisioned the car, put it into production, and had orchestrated the
massive and successful publicity campaign that had resulted in such an initial burst
of enthusiasm. How had he managed it? After all, others had already failed where
Bricklin dared to tread, and launching a new automobile – for all the opportunities
that the marketplace had to offer – was an incredibly risky, costly, and daring act.
The North American auto industry had, since the 1930s, operated as an oligopoly,
with the Big Three of General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler dominating sales with
over 90% of the market. Indeed, after the 1960s, when the Big Three had essentially
squashed much smaller competitors such as Nash and Studebaker, only the
American Motors Corporation remained as an “independent.” By then the cost of a
new vehicle launch was often in the tens of millions, and new competitors faced a
daunting challenge entering the auto marketplace.17
In fact, during the post-Second World War period there had been only two serious
attempts to launch a new American car company. Both had occurred in the late
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17 For an overview, see John B. Rae, The American Automobile Industry (Boston: Twayne
Publishers, 1984).
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1940s, when the disruptive effects of the war opened new opportunities to makers
outside of the Big Three and the handful of independents that remained. One was the
Kaiser-Frazer Corporation: Henry J. Kaiser started his company in 1946, but
eventually ended car production in the early 1950s. The brand, however, continued
to exist under the Willys name, building the famous Jeep until it was bought by
American Motors in 1970. The other was the famous Tucker, but Preston Tucker
never managed to get to the production stage.18 Bricklin was building the first new
American car in nearly three decades, a venture that was not for the faint of heart.
Modernity, industrial modernity and the automobile
For all of its challenges and difficulties, and notwithstanding the very few actual
examples of an attempt to build a car after 1945 in North America, carmaking in the
postwar period retained an allure that gripped the imaginations of entire nations,
regions, and state-builders. New Brunswick was not exceptional in this regard; in
fact, in its quest to build the Bricklin and an auto industry the province simply
reflected long-standing impulses that had been present since the beginning of the
20th century.
This was the case, in part, because the automobile was so intimately connected
to the very notion of modernity. Though the onset of modernity was a longstanding
process – one which spans centuries in some scholars’ views – the late 19th and early
20th centuries brought an acceleration of the seismic transformations to human
society most often defined as “modernity.” Historian Keith Walden has catalogued
these changes:
Cities grew inexorably; powerful new business organizations
announced their presence with high-rise office towers and
sprawling factories; bureaucratic centralization and regulation
became more pronounced; migrations from distant parts of the
globe snowballed; medical breakthroughs abounded; scientific
discoveries spawned startling new theories; and bicycles,
automobiles, dry-process photographs, halftones, movies, tractors,
electric lights, typewriters, telephones, and other marvels of
technological sophistication appeared with dizzying regularity.19
The automobile was but one step in this catalogue of modernity, but cars represented
particularly profound change. Ian McKay has described the condition of modernity
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18 On Kaiser, see Richard M. Langworth, Kaiser-Frazer, The Last Onslaught on Detroit: An
Intimate Behind the Scenes Study of the Postwar American Car Industry (New York: American
Quarterly Publications, 1975). On Tucker, see Charles T. Pearson, The Indomitable Tin Goose:
The True Story of Preston Tucker and His Car (New York: Pocket Books, 1974). The Tucker case
was portrayed in a 1988 feature film: Tucker: The Man and His Dream, dir. Francis Ford Coppola
(feature film, Lucasfilm, 1988). Though there is no fictionalized account of the Bricklin, there
have been two documentaries about the car company: La Légende Bricklin, dir. Chris LeBlanc
(television documentary, Cojack Productions, 2006), and Premier, Promoter & Their Car, dir.
Duguld Modsley (television documentary, Barna-Alper, 2004).
19 Keith Walden, Becoming Modern in Toronto: The Industrial Exhibition and the Shaping of a Late
Victorian Culture (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 4.
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as “the lived experience of unremitting change,” one fuelled largely by industrial
capitalism.20 The automobile was the epitome of Joseph Schumpeter’s
entrepreneurial “creative destruction,” a process that unleashed and accelerated
change.21
More so than any other technological, social, or political artefact or construct, the
automobile exemplified what it meant to be modern: the automobile itself was a
machine, one that changed conceptions of time, place, work, leisure, space, and
home, while the industry that had created it – personified by Henry Ford and his
moving assembly line – was the exemplar of industrialization, efficiency, scale, and
wealth creation. Just as importantly, the car and its industry had destroyed older
notions of work and life and automobility had forever changed the established
institutions and conceptions of society – from business to the built environment to
the activities of the state to notions of individuality.22 “Fordism” became a
worldwide phenomenon, one that described a number of causes and consequences
of this new form of mass industrialization. At the same time that Fordism described
the mass production, standardization, and scale of the moving assembly line and the
hugeness of Ford’s vast industrial factories, notably the gigantic Rouge Plant in
Detroit, it also described (along with the work of F.W. Taylor or “Taylorism” – the
scientific management of labour) the idea of paying workers well enough to actually
purchase the products they built (the famous “$5 dollar day”). Fordism was also
used to describe the paternalistic, corporate welfare approach to workers. Henry
Ford became the wealthiest man on the planet, and his “system” and cars ushered in
an economic and social revolution.23
This could be seen in the car’s tremendous impact upon North America and
Europe by the 1920s and 1930s. Utilizing vertical and horizontal integration on a
scale never before seen by humankind to build his machines, by 1927 Ford had sold
15 million Model-Ts, and soon much of the world was on wheels – or wanted to be.
Henry’s first international subsidiary, Ford Canada, working from its own “modern”
facilities in Windsor, Ontario, built and sold hundreds of thousands of cars to far
flung locales as distant as Malaysia, Australia, and South Africa. Giant companies
such as General Motors utilized a new class of professional managers to create
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20 Ian McKay, The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century
Nova Scotia (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1994), x.
21 Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger
Publishing, 1947).
22 On the impact of the auto upon modernity, see, for instance, Ray Batchelor, Henry Ford, Mass
Production, Modernism, and Design (New York: Manchester University Press, 1994). For views
on the coming of modernity to Canada, see G.B. Norcliffe, Ride to Modernity: The Bicycle in
Canada, 1869-1900 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001); see also Walden’s Becoming
Modern in Toronto.
23 The literature on Henry Ford and Fordism is immense. For a very small sample, see Richard Bak,
Henry and Edsel: The Creation of the Ford Empire (New York: Wiley, 2003); Stephen Watts, The
People’s Tycoon: Henry Ford and the American Century (New York: A.A. Knopf, 2005); and
David Gartman, From Autos to Architecture: Fordism and Architectural Aesthetics in the
Twentieth Century (New York: Princeton Architectural Press, 2009). On the impact of Ford in
Canada, see David Roberts, In the Shadow of Detroit: Gordon M. McGregor, Ford of Canada,
and Motoropolis (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2006).
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modern finance, advertising marketing, branding, and sales and distribution
networks. The effect of these sprawling, bureaucratic corporations was no less than
a re-ordering of the market as well as the birth of entirely new notions of
consumption and production.24 Moreover, the social impact of the car was
tremendous, reshaping and remaking everyday life by impacting issues as diverse as
traffic, work, pollution, sex, city-design, home-building, accidents, travel, and even
the rituals of birth, marriage, and death (to name but a few).25
The automobile’s imprint as the talisman of modernity became ubiquitous not
only in everyday life, but in artistic expression. In his famous film “Modern Times,”
Charlie Chaplin mocked and immortalized Ford’s moving assembly line and its
reduction of humanity into faceless automation.26 In literature, works such as Aldous
Huxley’s Brave New World imagined a future where Ford was elevated to the status
of a god. F. Scott Fitzgerald made the car a central aspect of The Great Gatsby, as
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24 On the growth of these enterprises and their impact on the market, see Alfred D. Chandler’s
classic The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Boston: Belknap,
1977). For another view of the interplay between these giant corporations and the market, see
Sally H. Clarke, Trust and Power: Consumers, the Modern Corporation, and the Making of the
United States Automobile Market (Boston: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
25 There is a vast literature on the social impact of the car. A very few examples include Peter D.
Norton, Fighting Traffic: The Dawn of the Motor Age in the American City (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2008); Dean Ruffilli, “The Car in Canadian Culture, 1898-1983” (PhD diss.,
University of Western Ontario, 2006); Tom McCarthy, Auto Mania: Cars, Consumers and the
Environment (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007); Danielle Robinson, “Modernism at
a Crossroad: The Spadina Expressway Controversy in Toronto, Ontario ca. 1960-71,” Canadian
Historical Review 92, no. 2 (June 2011): 295-322; and Stephen Davies, “‘Reckless Walking Must
be Discouraged’: The Automobile Revolution and the Shaping of Modern Urban Canada to
1930,” Urban History Review 18, no. 2 (Spring 1989): 123-38.
26 Earlier films, such as Fitz Lang’s Metropolis (Germany 1927), had also provided a critique of
industrialization.
Figure 3: Diego Rivera’s masterpiece of industrial modernity, Detroit Industry, 1933.
Source: The Detroit Institute of Arts.
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did other American and European authors who placed the automobile at the centre
of modernity.27 Diego Rivera’s industrial murals in the Detroit Art Institute became
famous both as expressions of industrial modernity and as critiques of the life-
changing impact of the car and the processes that had created it.28
But automobile modernity was more than a state of being, more than a consequence
for individuals and communities. It was also an aspirational goal for nations and
governments. In countries around the world, “automania” became the order of the day
during the interwar and post-Second World War periods. From Brazil to the Soviet
Union to Japan the car was embraced, and car production was lusted after as the mark
of a modern industrial economy. Brazilians took a chance on a massive Ford rubber-
growing operation in the 1920s and 1930s, while at the same time encouraging local
car production as a way to achieve a modern economy. The car and its industry,
according to the historian Joel Wolfe, created for Brazilians “hope for an eventual
industrial transformation of society . . . . The opening of automobile factories held out
the promise of the creation of a disciplined, nonradical working class that mirrored
what Brazilians perceived to be the experiences of workers in the United States . . .
driven by an established mythology about the ways automobility would transform the
nation and its poor.”29 Mexicans, for their part, saw the development of an auto sector
as an essential element of the “dream of modernity.”30 In Soviet Russia, of course, car
production was seen as the epitome of state planning and a goal of industrial
accomplishment, one that was meant to rival the Americans though it often fell
somewhat short.31 Japan’s economic “miracle” in the postwar period was only truly
recognized when it became a successful manufacturer (and exporter) of automobiles;
the ascendency of firms such as Toyota, Honda, and Nissan (Datsun in the early 1970s)
granted Japan a rank in the “first world” of “modern” economies.32 Industrial
modernity, and the status it conferred, was a worldwide goal of state politicians and
planners as well as something supported by the general public.
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Thus, by the early 1970s the idea of carmaking as a bridge to modernity was not
new. Some scholars even referred to the impact of the automobile upon society as
multiple stages of “automobile consciousness.”33 Even the growing backlash against
automobiles in North America – one personified by Ralph Nader’s safety attacks on
the car and General Motors, and the growing unease about cars’ emissions – did not
dissuade planners and politicians on both sides of the border from seeking auto
investment. For a region such as New Brunswick, with high unemployment, out-
migration, and a long history of economic decline based on resource extraction, the
idea of an auto industry was enthralling. This was especially true for the idea’s main
advocate, Premier Richard Hatfield. Hatfield was simply following in the footsteps
of a long line of industrial development promoters in New Brunswick, other Atlantic
provinces, and well beyond the confines of North America in pursuing a dream of
industrial modernity through automobile production.
New Brunswick and Maritime attempts at industrial modernity and the Bricklin
New Brunswick, and the Maritimes more generally, had not been immune to the
attractions of industrial modernity before Bricklin. There are many examples of
attempts to “modernize” and to become “industrial.” These two concepts are not
necessarily connected. Industrial development, as an element of regional economic
development, does not necessarily mean modernity. The efforts to revive the coal
and steel industry in Nova Scotia, or the expansion of resource extractive industries,
were attempts at economic development, but not necessarily industrial
modernization through mass manufacturing. But there are several examples of
Maritime or Atlantic Canadian efforts to grasp the brass ring of both industrial and
economic development and modernity in the Maritimes: wholesaling, power
development, and consumer goods.34
Indeed, the vast range of efforts by state planners and politicians in Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick in the “modern” era challenges narratives of a hegemonic anti-
modernism in the region. While McKay’s Quest of the Folk makes a spirited
argument about the prevailing influence of anti-modernism as a touchstone of Nova
Scotia in the interwar (and into the postwar) period, others have challenged this
view. As historian Greg Marquis notes in his assessment of McKay’s book,
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Nova Scotia, like other provinces, had a countervailing discourse of
modernity as expressed through the media, business, politics, the
arts and popular culture. Municipal and provincial politicians,
industrialists, real estate interests, boards of trade, chambers of
commerce and other “boosters” did not portray Nova Scotia or the
region as an antimodern backwater. The pages of The Busy East,
published initially in Saint John and then for many years in
Sackville, New Brunswick, suggest a region grasping for economic
and technological modernity. Although the publication’s successor,
Atlantic Advocate, published in the 1950s and 1960s local colour
stories, regional history, folktales and other items that support
McKay’s general thesis, it also advocated the full modernization of
Maritime society.35
This can be seen in Nova Scotia’s efforts to build a viable high-technology sector in
the province. In the postwar period, Nova Scotia attempted to establish – primarily
through government support such as loans and grants – a number of advanced
technology sectors and firms in the province. Industries as diverse as the production
of radios and heavy water were started with significant government investment,
most of which were not successful. New Brunswick, similarly, had its own industrial
development initiatives that attempted to develop a higher industrial and
technological profile for the province, such as the Westmorland Chemical Plant.36
But the auto industry held out a much more tantalizing embrace of technology,
capital, and mass production than any of these previous attempts. The car, even in
the 1970s, was the epitome of industrial maturity, and the wages, spin-offs and scale
of a car plant had a potential that enticed politicians in many jurisdictions to
encourage automotive investment. Nova Scotia provided incentives for Volvo to set
up a plant in the early 1960s, and the Swedish firm was ramping up production at its
Halifax-area plant by the time Bricklin announced his venture. In the same period
that Bricklin was settling on New Brunswick for his new venture, Nova Scotia was
also home to Canadian Motor Industries or CMI, a rudimentary Japanese assembly
plant in Cape Breton that put together Isuzus and Toyotas beginning in 1968. CMI
has the distinction of being the first Japanese automotive assembly facility in North
America.37
Indeed, though the Maritimes seemed to be a destination for new automotive
ventures in the postwar period, New Brunswick was not in fact Bricklin’s first
choice. The initial contact was with the Quebec government, but Quebec already had
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its own nascent auto sector with a GM plant and a few parts outfits. The Quebec
government’s money was also already going to a number of other state-sponsored
industrial development projects. In addition, the Bricklin plan did not look that
sound to Quebec officials. But across the border, in New Brunswick, a young
premier eager to make his mark was looking for something to spark the provincial
economy. Someone in Quebec knew someone in New Brunswick; Bricklin soon had
an audience with Hatfield, and quickly convinced the politician of his dream. The
dream became Hatfield’s, too, as the premier was captivated by the idea of building
flashy cars in his otherwise economically dreary province. By the summer of 1973
the company had an agreement to build cars in New Brunswick, and money from the
provincial coffers (and eventually a loan from the federal government) to get
started.38 Bricklin had successfully sold himself – and his car – metaphorically, to
the government and its premier.
When it came to New Brunswick and the Bricklin, it was easy to see how part of
the allure of the automobile was the car’s high profile and its potential to draw
attention to the province. This was different from resource extraction or even the
heavy industries that existed in New Brunswick. Hatfield himself felt as much,
stating at one point “What sets the [Bricklin] apart from an investment, in the
expansion of a port or a chemical complex, is the publicity that attaches to the
manufacture of a new automobile by a new automobile company. It has a high
visibility, it attracts wide attention and speculative comment.” 39
Moreover, building a car was different, required different skill sets, and reflected
a commitment to precision, complexity, and innovation that simply did not exist in
those other, older sectors of the economy. Building cars could forever bury the idea
of New Brunswickers as “hewers of wood and drawers of water.” And the Bricklin
itself was even a step above most cars being produced in the 1970s; in its marketing
(if not its production reality) it was sold as a high-tech car, one with the latest
advances in plastics, engineering, and safety features. After its initial launch, the
SV1 was heralded in magazines and trade journals as an innovative advance on
automobile technology. Bricklin and his car were honoured by the Ontario Science
Centre for exemplifying what one member of its board of trustees said was “the
philosophy of the centre.”40 The car was also featured at the Canadian National
Exhibition, and even at the Chicago Consumer Electronics Show.
Not only was the car innovative, it was spectacularly stylish as well. This made
it even more attractive to a politician like Hatfield, who was keen to use Bricklin as
a dramatic showcase for the province’s innovative potential. As Hatfield admitted in
a 1985 Maclean’s interview, “It’s not that I was ever very much interested in cars. It
was the sheer sculptured beauty of the Bricklin, with its doors like a gull’s wings:
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the idea that something so revolutionary could be made here, in New Brunswick.”41
It was, the Daily Gleaner reported, “the most modern and sophisticated product ever
produced in the history of New Brunswick.”42 During the 1974 provincial campaign,
referred to by some journalists as the “Bricklin election” despite the many other
issues also prominent in the election, Hatfield drove across the province in a leased
Bricklin, and his party’s television advertisements featured the car and Bricklin’s
assembly line.43 The car, and the idea of building Bricklins in New Brunswick, was
more than a simple subtext to the campaign – there was an explicit understanding
that a Hatfield mandate meant the province’s continued support for the venture. At
campaign events, rallies, and in the news, Hatfield, Bricklin, and the car itself were
seemingly always present. When Hatfield won the election on the promise of a
Bricklin-fuelled better future, Bricklin was there to celebrate “decked out in
Western-style garb, the epitome of the Playboy male.”44 If ever there was an
electoral campaign built around the allure of the auto industry in the postwar period
in North America, this was it.
Even opponents of the car hedged their criticism initially, given the Bricklin’s
innovative potential. Though Liberal opposition leader Robert Higgins was “a bit on
the sceptical side” regarding the car, he “sincerely” hoped it would work and
understood what the car could mean: “I don’t want to be the guy that turns down the
Wright brothers.”45 Others were not so enamoured, and one critic later mockingly
called the car the “Great Pumpkin out of Cinderella.”46 But on balance, despite the
close election results – Hatfield’s Conservatives won 33 seats to Higgins’s Liberals’
26 – many New Brunswickers were willing to take a chance on Hatfield and his and
Bricklin’s dream.
At the same time, the process of building the Bricklin was different as well. For
all the critiques – and there were many detractors of mass production as exemplified
by the automobile’s production – the notion of the modern assembly line was still
held aloft as a mark of industrial maturity. An automobile assembly line would put
New Brunswick on the map. Economic Development Deputy Minister Harry Nason
put it this way:
We have been referred to as the unknown Maritime Province, so the
whole matter of assembly line production in New Brunswick with a
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New Brunswick work force is very much open to question. We do
heavy industrial things here. We build ships, we build snow-blowers
in Bathurst, but these are custom jobs, and the discipline that is
required in a labour force where the line moves every few minutes
and you have exactly so many minutes to do a quality job on a
certain thing is very different.47
This discourse, to be able to implement Fordism and exhibit an ability to create
things on the same scale as a Detroit, Toyota City, or Oshawa, reflected an allure of
the assembly line that still drew politicians and planners – and dreamers such as
Hatfield and his government.
These kind of dreams also required faith, which Hatfield and his colleagues had
in no short supply. Along with the dependence on technology and industrial
modernity, Bricklin required a good dose of belief since the end product was a risk.
Risk reflected the nature of business and entrepreneurialism that was also such a
feature of modernity. Hatfield was not unaware of these risks, but proclaimed “I
hope and believe the Bricklin car will now become a symbol of what New
Brunswick and its people can do, an example of the risks we must run, the patience
we must show, the faith we must keep if we are to become a province of economic
opportunity and diversity.”48
Hatfield’s invocation was echoed by his economic growth minister, Paul
Creaghan, who told New Brunswickers in 1974 that “now is the time to have faith”
in the Bricklin. This prompted one waggish citizen to reply “Indeed, for the well
being of this province, all we can do is have faith, though many experts in the field
do not, and are impatiently awaiting the first disaster . . . . Seeing it is our ‘pennies’
involved, Mr Creaghan, we must indeed have faith in it.”49 Similarly, the Moncton
Times opined that
a key to the success of the Bricklin must be confidence here where
it is being brought to life. The pooh-poohing of the project to date
seems to indicate that there are some New Brunswickers who
almost want to see Bricklin fail . . . . The road ahead of the Bricklin
is not an easy one to travel, but the route can be eased somewhat if
confidence is exhibited in the project in this province, by all parties
and by the public as a whole. After all, if it is sniped at and criticized
here where it is being built how can one expect dealers and would-
be purchasers to have confidence at the other end of the line?50
At the car’s glitzy New York launch in June of 1974, Hatfield sounded more like
a revivalist minister than a hard-nosed politician: “Evidence of faith, they say, is
evidence of things not seen.” Hatfield had “invested a lot of faith in this car. When
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I say that I’ve invested a lot of personal faith in this car, that’s what I mean from the
point of view of my political career because if it all goes bust, as a lot of people have
said it would, everybody would say I was a damn fool.” But he was still hopeful: “I
still think you’ve got to try, and you’ve got to believe, and you’ve got to try new
things. Some may go under and some of them may succeed. But nothing will happen
unless you try something.”51
Yet for Hatfield the Bricklin was more than just a matter of faith; it also provided
an opportunity to get back at the naysayers. Hatfield could point to the car’s
futurism, and his province’s ability to build it, as a way of sticking it to Ottawa and
the central provinces who, in his eyes, had for so long looked down upon his
province.52 Ottawa had proven very difficult in terms of providing support for
Bricklin, either through regional development loans or through granting the
company status under the 1965 Canada-US Auto Pact (which would have helped the
firm considerably by giving it duty-free importation rights from the US). This was a
very important consideration for a company that planned to build all of its cars in
Canada and sell all of them in the US; a Canadian sales network, ironically, was
never established. In its dealings with the federal government over the loan, Ottawa
rejected Bricklin’s first application and only gave Bricklin money after he put more
of his own financing into the project. When it came to Auto Pact status, one of the
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Figure 4: Bricklin, Hatfield, and their dream, New York, 1974.
Source: RS417-76-12-e, PANB.
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terms that Ottawa set out was that Bricklin be a Canadian-owned operation. This
was what prompted the provincial government to take a 51% equity share in
Bricklin; it would likely not have done so if the federal government had not driven
such a hard bargain and made Canadian ownership of a requirement for Auto Pact
consideration – status that was, in the end, never granted.53
At the Saint John plant’s opening, Hatfield declared that Bricklin’s “success will
be our success. We have come this far despite the pessimism of some politicians and
the scepticism of self-appointed experts.” After all, in his view, the people of his
province were “not just building a car. We’re building a better New Brunswick. If it
were produced in Ontario or Quebec there would be more optimism. We are not
supposed to have dreams. This ceremony proves they are wrong.”54 Later, as the
company teetered on the brink of bankruptcy and critics called for the province to
disclose everything about the venture, Hatfield remained defiant, especially towards
those outside his province whom he saw as scuttling the effort. Hatfield admitted
that “we cannot guarantee the success of any venture”; but, he challenged, “the
government cannot leave the economic development of New Brunswick to the
mercies of the Canadian banks, the Toronto boardrooms or the federal bureaucracy.
Without the involvement of the provincial government, there will be no sustained
economic development in New Brunswick except for the tasks these remote
institutions think us capable of and suitable for.”55
Bricklin was more than just an industrial development scheme, and the continued
unwillingness of Ottawa to grant the company status under the Auto Pact or
additional economic development loans – Ottawa was unwilling to sink any more
than its initial $3 million investment into the company – simply strengthened
Hatfield’s commitment. According to one study, Hatfield “saw the response to the
Bricklin proposal as another instance in which the economic development of his
province was being hindered by the excessive conservatism of a federal government
dominated by central Canadian interests.”56
As Bricklin wavered on the brink of failure, some New Brunswickers argued that
the project had been worth all the trouble and that Hatfield should be given the
benefit of the doubt. One anonymous “Bricklin Booster” wrote to the Saint John
Times-Globe: “It’s high time someone had a few good words for both the Premier
and the Bricklin project . . . which no matter what anyone says, has made Saint John
the most publicized city in North America these days.” Bricklin Booster even
included a copy of a poem, “The Opposition,” written by Leora Foster of North
Lake. The poem included stanzas such as the following:
The promises [Hatfield] made us
He fulfilled them every one,
And if they give him half a chance
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The new ones will be done.
And if you are so worried
About our Province dear
Just put your shoulder to the wheel
And help him with this deal.
By telling all the people
About this nifty car
And how it is a bargain
That will take you far.
And even buy a car or two
And then you’ll see the Bricklin
Roll off the assembly line.57
For all this hope, in the end Bricklin was a spectacular failure. In September of
1975, when it became clear that Bricklin was not making enough money and needed
more financing, the government put an ultimatum to Malcolm Bricklin.
Government-appointed members of the company’s board told Bricklin that he
needed to find more outside money in order to get continued government support.
When he produced a recapitalization proposal designed to keep the company afloat
and asked for another $10 million in financing from the province, it was deemed
unacceptable.58 In the middle of a board meeting, Hatfield dramatically arrived to
tell the Bricklin directors that no more money would be forthcoming.59 The company
was done, and Bricklin’s – and Hatfield’s – dreams dashed. A few days later Hatfield
told reporters “I want to say that we still have confidence in the car. Unfortunately,
however, there is a limit beyond which it would not be prudent for a government to
risk further funds on the basis of such confidence.”60 By that point, New Brunswick
had poured over $20 million into the venture.
Conclusion
There are many reasons that help to explain the Bricklin’s eventual demise. This
article has not focused on those reasons, but instead has tried to connect the Bricklin
case to wider conceptualizations of modernity and industrial development, to the
local, regional, and national political economies surrounding New Brunswick, and
to economic development ideas particularly around the automobile industry.
Bricklin reflected the attempts by a sub-national government to bring to its region
an industrial driver that would help to alleviate the economic insecurity the region
faced (high unemployment, out-migration) and to break the region’s dependence on
resource extraction and seasonal and low-wage employment. In doing so, New
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Brunswick was not unlike many other regions around the world that sought out
automotive investment as a panacea for economic uncertainty. Even in North
America as late as the 1970s, in a period about to become known for
deindustrialization, auto investment was still seen as the pinnacle of economic
“maturity” and a sign of a vibrant industrial development. From Mexico to Brazil to
Japan, nations and regions only “arrived” and became “major players” after they had
achieved an automobile industry.
But at the same time, of course, Bricklin was more than that. The nature of the
auto industry, itself a harbinger and cause of “modernity” as we understand it,
attached to itself something more than a patina of newness, technological
advancement, and sheer scale and scope. Auto was different from other types of
industries, and its image – one created, condemned, and glorified by nearly a century
of representation – drew politicians and planners such as Richard Hatfield like
moths to light. Auto production was the height of industrial modernity, and this helps
to explain why Hatfield and his province were willing to take such a chance on what
seems, in retrospect, such an improbable proposition.
The dream of the Bricklin as a spur to launch New Brunswick into a new era of
economic prosperity, modernity, and industrial maturity died hard. Even after the
traumatic failure of the firm and the political backlash that intermittently and
sometimes intensely dogged Hatfield for the remainder of his time in office, Bricklin
remained both a reminder of that dream and the high cost of that dream: as late as
1987 the government was still responding to questions from interested parties about
restarting production of the car, long after all the machinery had been auctioned off,
the company’s records carted off to settle eventually at the Detroit National
Automotive History Collection, and the schematics deposited in the provincial
archives.61 But this is not surprising, given the allure of an idea of building such a
dramatic and stylish product in a place as unlikely as New Brunswick.
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